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Consumer vulnerability
prominent issue since the
service provider contracts,1
significant concerns where

*

in online transactions has been a
beginning of e-commerce and online
and indeed has continued to present
consumers engage with any business

Associate Professor, Legal Studies, Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, University
of Ontario Institute of Technology.
1
United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Bureau of Consumer Protection, Consumer
Protection in the Global Electronic Marketplace: Looking Ahead (September 2000), <https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/consumer-protection-global-electronic-marketplace-looking-ahead/
electronicmkpl.pdf>, at 7 [hereinafter “U.S. Federal Trade Commission”] (“Shifting to a pure country-oforigin approach to address challenges inherent in the current system risks undermining consumer
protection, and ultimately consumer confidence in e-commerce. The same would be true under a
‘prescribed-by-seller’ approach to the extent it would allow contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
provisions dictated by the seller to override the core protections afforded to consumers in their home
country or their right to sue in a local court.”). These concerns were raised in Michael Geist’s seminal
article on jurisdiction in online contract law in 2001, which the dissent in Douez v. Facebook, [2017] S.C.J.
No. 33, 2017 SCC 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Douez”] cites, though not for these concerns: “... Consumers
anxious to purchase online must also balance the promise of unlimited choice, greater access to
information, and a more competitive global marketplace with the fact that they may not benefit from the
security normally afforded by local consumer protection laws. Although such laws exist online, just as they
do offline, their effectiveness is severely undermined if consumers do not have recourse within their local
court system or if enforcing a judgment requires further proceedings in another jurisdiction.”: Michael
A. Geist, “Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction” (2001) 16:3
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1345, at 1347-48 [hereinafter “Geist”]. See also Geist, id., at 1357-58, where he
discusses both legislative efforts and inconsistent court rulings on enforcement of forum selection clauses
in consumer contracts already in the early days of the popular Internet.
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model relying on digital platforms.2 With the majority decision in
Douez v. Facebook, the Supreme Court of Canada has expanded
consumer protection in the context of online contracts, with regard to
any statutory privacy rights available to consumers in Canada.3 The
decision takes an important further step towards constitutionalizing
privacy, and securing means to redress power imbalances online.
With plurality reasons delivered by Karakatsanis J., concurring
reasons by Abella J., and a dissent delivered by McLachlin C.J.C.
and Côté J., the case as a whole reflects wrangling over the relative
significance of both the consumer context and the underlying
statutory privacy rights at issue in this case, where the Court is
tasked with determining the enforceability of a contractual forum
selection clause. Justice Karakatsanis’s reasons draw strongly on
the special character of privacy protections in Canadian law in
order to justify ruling that any forum-selection clause outside of
the consumer’s home jurisdiction in an online consumer contract is
likely to be unenforceable with regard to privacy-based actions.4
Justice Abella would invalidate those clauses in the consumer
context more broadly. Both sets of reasons acknowledge creating
new law, and both point to the development of digital technologies
as a motivation for the required change. The dissent did not
consider the consumer context nor the underlying statutory privacy
rights to merit finding the forum selection clause at issue to be
unenforceable in this case, and would not have adapted the current
test for forum selection clause enforceability. The majority position
is a win for consumer privacy, and is a welcome development in an
information ecosphere that has increasingly demonstrated the
2
Marina Pavlović, “Contracting Out of Access to Justice: Enforcement of Forum-Selection
Clauses in Consumer Contracts” (2016) 62:2 McGill L.J. 389, at 396 [hereinafter “Pavlović”]; many
others are also cited in the decision.
3
Douez, supra, note 1, at para. 76.
4
The Facebook clause at issue read:
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) you have with us arising out
of or relating to this Statement or Facebook exclusively in a state or federal court located in
Santa Clara County. The laws of the State of California will govern this Statement, as well
as any claim that might arise between you and us, without regard to conflict of law
provisions. You agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the courts located in Santa
Clara County, California for purpose of litigating all such claims.
Douez, supra, note 1, at para. 8.
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vulnerability of consumers to the powerful profit incentives of
online businesses, most of which are located outside of Canada.5
The relevance of this decision for privacy in our current and future
technologically structured social world also derives from its
contribution to a trend toward understanding the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms designation of privacy as a fundamental value to apply
not only to state actors, but also to private actors.6 This move is
particularly appropriate regarding consumer privacy protection in
digital environments, where most if not all of the infrastructure is
owned by private companies who determine how users’ personal
information will be handled, and who have proven to require legal
constraints to protect user interests.7 The decision reflects a modest
step toward realizing that our traditional divisions between state and
private actors are not as meaningful as they might have been in the
pre-digital era: instead, it is power imbalance, fairness, and respect for
fundamental rights and values that should determine the obligations
of the stronger party vis-à-vis the categorically weaker one.8

5

I have been advocating for seeing consumer protection as the most promising approach to
privacy and data protection, tracing the expanding role of the FTC in the United States and the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada in Canada to deal precisely with the wildly unbridled digital data
ecosystem. Andrea Slane & Ganaele Langlois, “Debunking the Myth of ‘Not My Bad’: Sexual Images,
Consent and Online Host Responsibilities in Canada” (2018) 30:1 Canadian Journal of Women and the
Law 42-81; Andrea Slane, “Search Engines and the Right to Be Forgotten: Squaring the Remedy with
Canadian Values on Personal Information Flow” (2018) 55:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 349-97.
6
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. Application of Charter values to the common law is discussed in
several SCC cases such as R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, at 675 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Salituro”]; Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 1130, at para. 95 (S.C.C.); and Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 558 v.
Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.).
7
Calls for regulation have been amplified again recently in the face of the Facebook/Cambridge
Analytica scandal. These calls are often directed at Facebook — as the supposed “trusted party” in this
mess — in the wake of revelations of inaction or outright failure to safeguard users’ personal data from
such bald faced exploitation, both before and after discovery of the data harvesting. Some commentators
have been quick to point out that Cambridge Analytica’s use of Facebook users’ data is actually really not
all that much outside of Facebook’s core business model, which has always been very friendly to app
developers when it comes to allowing harvesting of user data: Olivia Solon, “‘A grand illusion’: Seven
days that shattered Facebook’s facade” The Guardian (March 24, 2018), <https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/mar/24/cambridge-analytica-week-that-shattered-facebook-privacy>.
8
Andrea Slane, “Information Brokers, Fairness, and Privacy in Publicly Accessible
Information” (2018) 4 Canadian Journal of Contemporary and Comparative Law 249-91;
Mary Anne Franks, “Democratic Surveillance” (2017) 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 425.
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This paper will map out the significance of Douez along these
two lines. First, I will unpack how Douez represents progress in the
move toward recognizing power imbalance, regardless of whether
the seat of that power is government or commercial, as a significant
factor in allocating both rights and obligations. Second, I will
analyze Douez for its contribution to the move toward recognizing
the fundamental value of protecting privacy, which in turn further
expands protection obligations from state actors to private ones.
These moves are fully intertwined in Douez, but their development
has up until now not been so closely connected: understanding how
we got here along these two lines will help to situate how and why
the ruling is justified in bringing them together.
Justice Karakatsanis sets out the core reasons for finding the
forum selection clause at issue in Douez to be unenforceable like
this: “The grossly uneven bargaining power between the parties
and the importance of adjudicating quasi-constitutional privacy
rights in the province are reasons of public policy that are
compelling, and when considered together, are decisive in this
case.”9 There are three elements at play here: “grossly uneven
bargaining power”; “quasi-constitutional privacy rights”; and “the
importance of adjudicating [those rights] in the province” as
matters of public policy. Together, these three elements represent a
recalibration of rights protection with regard to an increasingly
powerful private sector in the technologically enabled information
economy.
I. THE CONSUMER CONTRACT CONTEXT: GROSSLY UNEVEN
BARGAINING POWER IN ONLINE CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
The idea of protecting weaker parties from the potential abuses of
more powerful ones undergirds both the Charter and consumer
protection law. The Charter in large part protects against government
failure to serve as a guardian of the rights of more vulnerable
people, both as an institution and as an expression of dominant
9

Douez, supra, note 1, at para. 4.
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majority will in a democracy.10 Consumer protection statutes aim to
redress the power imbalance between commercial entities and
consumers by providing consumers with both rights and procedures
for addressing violation of those rights.11 As corporate commercial
interests in the digital realm determine both the terms of contractual
relations with consumers and the overall structure of information
flow (including its commercial exploitation), it has long been
recognized that consumer protection principles must assume a
primary role in online rights protection, and that forum selection
clauses in particular are troubling derogations from consumer
protections.12
The three sets of reasons in Douez do not dispute that consumers
are the weaker party in transactions with online service providers,
including Facebook: they differ in the role that they permit courts to
take in bringing consumer protection to the fore when considering
whether to enforce a forum selection clause in a consumer contract.
Justice Karakatsanis casts the consumer context as a sufficiently
distinguishing factor capable of justifying alteration of the test for
enforceability set out in Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V.,
which, unlike Douez, involved “sophisticated commercial entities”.13
As she writes,
But commercial and consumer relationships are very different.
Irrespective of the formal validity of the contract, the consumer context
may provide strong reasons not to enforce forum selection clauses. For
example, the unequal bargaining power of the parties and the rights that a
consumer relinquishes under the contract, without any opportunity to
negotiate, may provide compelling reasons for a court to exercise its

10
See, for instance, the case law regarding s. 2(d) freedom of association (e.g., Mounted
Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, 2015 SCC 1, at
para. 58 (S.C.C.)), or discussion of s. 15 equality and s. 7 (see Jennifer Koshan, “Redressing the
Harms of Government (In)Action: A Section 7 Versus Section 15 Charter Showdown” (2013)
22(1) Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel 31-46).
11
See, for instance, Freya Kodar, “Conceptions of Borrowers and Lenders in the Canadian
Payday Loan Regulatory Process: The Evidence from Manitoba and Nova Scotia” (Fall 2011) 34
Dal. L.J. 443.
12
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, supra, note 1.
13
Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V., [2003] S.C.J. No. 23, 2003 SCC 27, [2003] 1
S.C.R. 450 (S.C.C.), cited in Douez, supra, note 1, at para. 35.
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discretion to deny a stay of proceedings, depending on the other
14
circumstances of the case.

The two-step test set out in Pompey (first, whether the
contract/clause is valid; second, whether there is “strong cause” —
according to traditional jurisdiction determining factors — for setting
the forum selection clause aside) must be modified to include these
additional factors in the second step. That is, online consumer
contracts are forged in circumstances calling for expansion of the
relevant factors beyond the traditional jurisdictional factors. Justice
Karakatsanis sees this expansion as an “appropriate incremental
response of the common law to a different context”, a move that is
“especially important since online consumer contracts are ubiquitous,
and the global reach of the Internet allows for instantaneous crossborder consumer transactions” making it “necessary to keep private
international law ‘in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our
society’”.15
Moreover, while the general enforceability of forum selection
clauses in commercial contracts serves the public policy goals of
certainty and support for party autonomy, serving those goals in the
consumer context is better achieved by generally not enforcing such
clauses where doing so would deprive consumers of rights where they
have had no power to negotiate, so that “instead of supporting
certainty and security, forum selection clauses in consumer contracts
may do ‘the opposite for the millions of ordinary people who would
not foresee or expect its implications and cannot be deemed to have
undertaken sophisticated analysis of foreign legal systems prior to
opening an online account’”.16 Nonetheless, Karakatsanis J. does not
go so far as to consider forum selection clauses in online consumer
contracts to be generally unenforceable, without the additional
consideration of what rights are at stake.17
14

Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 36, citing Salituro, supra, note 6, at 670.
16
Id., at para. 33, citing Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest
Clinic Factum, at para. 7.
17
Id., at para. 39. This is a point of difference with Abella J.’s concurring reasons. For an
account of the inconsistency with which Canadian courts have or have not enforced forum selection
clauses in consumer contracts, see Pavlović, supra, note 2.
15
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Justice Abella’s concurring reasons do go further along this path,
by locating the analysis in the first stage of the Pompey test. She
finds forum selection clauses in online consumer contracts to be
essentially unconscionable, in that they are always forged in a
context of power imbalance and are unfair to the weaker party
whenever any rights are lost or made more difficult to enforce.18 The
McLachlan C.J.C. and Côté J. dissent, on the other hand, stresses
that power inequality is a feature of many contracts, and so there
must be some stronger element of procedural unfairness as well as a
bad bargain for the weaker party — as supported by evidence in
each case — for courts to decline to enforce contractual terms.19 The
dissent would further not expand the factors considered in the
“strong cause” test from Pompey beyond the traditional factors
determining appropriate jurisdiction, and would leave the decision
to invalidate forum selection clauses in consumer contracts to
legislators, noting that here British Columbia, unlike some other
jurisdictions, has not expressly done so.20
The difference in approaches by the majority and the dissent
falls along the two types of legal analysis that Arthur J. Cockfield
identifies as common judicial responses to technological change:
“(1) a ‘liberal’ approach that is more sensitive to the ways that
technological change affects interests, while often seeking legal
solutions that are less deferential to legal precedents and traditional
doctrine; and (2) a ‘conservative’ approach that relies more on
traditional doctrinal analysis and precedents.”21 Consumer
contracts of adhesion have posed issues of power imbalance since

18
Douez, id., at paras. 114-116. Justice Abella argues (at para. 99) “it seems to me that
some legal acknowledgment should be given to the automatic nature of the commitments made with
this kind of contract, not for the purpose of invalidating the contract itself, but at the very least to
intensify the scrutiny for clauses that have the effect of impairing a consumer’s access to possible
remedies.” In support she cites numerous academic sources regarding the gross unfairness of forum
selection clauses to consumers (at para. 94) and notes that some jurisdictions have invalidated such
clauses in consumer contracts via statute (at para. 103).
19
Id., at para. 145.
20
Id., at paras. 143-144.
21
Arthur J. Cockfield, “Towards a Law and Technology Theory” (2004) 30 Man. L.J. 383,
at para. 2 [hereinafter “Cockfield”].
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they became common in the early 20th century.22 The majority’s
“liberal approach” in Douez responds to the ubiquity of transborder adhesion contracts in the online environment, where those
contracts routinely specify forums outside the home jurisdiction of
the consumer. The decision further responds to the fact that this
transaction format grew alongside passage, implementation and
gradual strengthening of private sector privacy legislation which in
turn represents a response to “an era in which technology
increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of
information” and consequently features the rapid growth of
technologically-facilitated consumer personal data collection and
use for commercial purposes.23 In other words, the majority in
Douez sees this case as having reached the tipping point where
change to the common law rules about when to set aside a
contractual forum selection clause is now appropriate.
II. THE QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PRIVACY LEGISLATION
Declaring British Columbia’s Privacy Act (BC Privacy Act) to
be “quasi-constitutional”, and so capable of tipping that scale in
favour of refusing to enforce a forum selection clause in a
consumer contract, is no doubt a major development for privacy in
Canada. The BC Privacy Act is among those provincial statutes
that reflect a popular will to overcome the reluctance of Canadian
common law to adopt privacy torts.24 The BC Privacy Act created
causes of action for both invasion of privacy and use of a person’s
name or portrait for commercial purposes without their consent
(commonly known as the tort of appropriation of personality).25
22

Edwin W. Patterson, “The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy” (1919) 33:2 Harv. L.

Rev. 198.
23

Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, s. 3
[hereinafter “PIPEDA”].
24
Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373 [hereinafter “BC Privacy Act”].
25
Id., ss. 1 and 3. The common law “privacy torts” are generally considered to have been
inspired by Warren and Brandeis’s famous 1890 article on the right to privacy: Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4:5 Harv. L. Rev. 193. William Prosser is
generally acknowledged as having categorized the development of the United States’ common law
torts into four types, which he named “intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs”; “Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff”; “Publicity
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The non-consensual use of a person’s portrait for advertising is the
underlying cause of action claimed in the class action suit that the
plaintiffs in Douez filed in the British Columbia Supreme Court,
rather than in California as designated in Facebook’s terms of use
and privacy policy.26 The ability of ordinary people who have not
already established economic value in commercial use of their
persona (e.g., celebrities, sports figures) has also been limited in
common law Canada, and a successful class action of this sort
would represent a significant development in all Canadians’ ability
to constrain commercial exploitation of their name or likeness.27
Again, the development of digital technologies that can
automatically exploit the portraits of non-famous people for
advertising purposes has simply changed the game.
The expansion of “quasi-constitutional” designation to a statute
that creates private law causes of action is the latest step in the
incremental elevation of privacy to a broadly fundamental right
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye”; and “Appropriation, for the defendant’s
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”. William L. Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48 Calif. L.
Rev. 383, at 389. These privacy torts did not uniformly take hold in common law Canada, until very
recently. A relatively weak variant of appropriation of a person’s name or likeness was established in
the 1970s, but the other torts were not fully recognized as common law causes of action until the
2010s by Canadian courts. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., [1973] O.J. No. 2157, 1 O.R. (2d) 225
(Ont. C.A.). Statutes creating privacy tort causes of action in various provinces, British Columbia
included, aimed to overcome the reluctance of Canadian courts to establish new causes of action for
invasion of privacy. Ontario, which does not have a statute establishing these causes of action and so
remains subject only to common law, has finally recognized “intrusion upon seclusion” and
“publication of private facts”, mainly as a result of considering technological change to have greatly
increased the risk of harm for privacy invasion. Jones v. Tsige, [2012] O.J. No. 148, 2012 ONCA 32
(Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Jones”]; Jane Doe 464533 v. N.D., [2016] O.J. No. 382, 2016 ONSC 541
(Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Doe v. N.D.”].
26
The class consists of 1.8 million British Columbia Facebook users whose profile portrait
was used by Facebook in relation to its “Sponsored Stories” advertising model, whereby the profile
picture of a Facebook user who “liked” a product or service would appear on the newsfeed of their
“friends” in ad form. Douez, supra, note 1, at paras. 6 and 81. Facebook faced a similar lawsuit
regarding the Sponsored Stories model in its home jurisdiction in California, and discontinued the ad
program in 2014. Fraley v. Facebook Inc., et al., no. 111-CV-196193 (Cal. Sup. Ct.), filed March
11, 2011 — this U.S. suit was settled in 2013: 966 F.Supp.2d 939 (2013). Brian Feldman, “Facebook
Reaches Settlement in Sponsored Stories Lawsuit” The Atlantic (August 27, 2013),
<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/08/facebook-reaches-settlement-sponsoredstories/311753/>.
27
Eric H. Reiter, “Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on the Right to
One’s Image” (2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 673; Amy Conroy, “Protecting Personality Right in Canada:
A Matter of Property or Privacy?” (2012) 1:1 U.W.O. J. Leg. Stud. 3, <http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/
uwojls/vol1/iss1/3/>.
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cutting across public and private law. The constitutional protection
of privacy is fairly narrow, as protected primarily by the right to be
secure against unreasonable search and seizure in section 8 of the
Charter.28 “Quasi-constitutional” status was first lent to the federal
Privacy Act, which sets out the parameters of proper federal
government handling of personal information, and next to those
statutes that regulate the handling of personal information by
private commercial entities (“PIPEDA”) at the federal level and
substantially similar provincial legislation such as Alberta’s
Personal Information Protection Act.29 The trend toward merger of
protection of privacy vis-à-vis the government to protection of
privacy vis-à-vis commercial entities is not discussed by the Douez
Court per se, but rather assumed to follow from the fundamental
importance of privacy rights in general:
At issue in this case is Ms. Douez’s statutory privacy right. Privacy
legislation has been accorded quasi-constitutional status (Lavigne v.
Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002
SCC 53, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773, at paras. 24-25). This Court has
emphasized the importance of privacy — and its role in protecting one’s
physical and moral autonomy — on multiple occasions (see Lavigne, at
para. 25; Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, at
paras. 65-66; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at p. 427).30
28
The s. 8, and to a lesser extent s. 7 case law discusses the fundamental importance of
privacy generally to democracy, for instance in R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R.
417, at 427 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dyment”], although the parameters of Charter privacy protection
for information privacy have been confined to fairly limited, intimate biographical information in
cases such as R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.); R. v. Tessling, [2004]
S.C.J. No. 63, 2004 SCC 67 (S.C.C.) and R. v. A.M., [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, 2008 SCC 19 (S.C.C.).
29
The cases in the progression recognizing personal data protection legislation as protecting
related fundamental values are Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official
Languages), [2002] S.C.J. No. 55, 2002 SCC 53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lavigne”] (re the federal
Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21) [hereinafter “Privacy Act”]; Eastmond v. Canadian Pacific
Railway, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1043, 2004 FC 852 (F.C.) [hereinafter “Eastmond”] (re PIPEDA, supra,
note 23); and Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial
Workers, Local 401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, 2013 SCC 62 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Local 401”] (re
Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P 6.5 [hereinafter “Alberta PIPA”].
What the cross-pollination of protection against unreasonable search and seizure with personal data
protection means going forward is an ongoing debate. Lisa M. Austin, “Towards a Public Law of
Privacy: Meeting the Big Data Challenge” (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 541. See also Michael Power,
“‘Personal Information’ in Canada: Is Change Coming?” (2013) blog post, <http://
michaelpower.ca/2013/12/personal-information-in-canada-is-change-coming-2/>.
30
Douez, supra, note 1, at para. 59.
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The cases cited by Karakatsanis J. as according quasiconstitutional status to “privacy legislation”, Lavigne and Dagg,31
both deal with the federal Privacy Act, regarding government
disclosure of personal information: it is Lavigne that employs the
label “quasi-constitutional”, while Dagg drew the initial parallel
between the Privacy Act and the underlying privacy interests
protected by section 8 of the Charter in Dyment.32
The move from federal public sector data protection legislation
to the private sector is not directly discussed in Karakatsanis J.’s
reasons. The trajectory stems from the idea of “quasi-constitutional
legislation”, though also not analyzed in Douez, which finds its
origins in the case law pertaining to human rights legislation as
implementing Charter values and capable of trumping other
legislation.33 In using the term “quasi-constitutional” to apply to
the Privacy Act in Lavigne, Gonthier J. draws on an earlier Federal
Court ruling, wherein, as he writes “Noël J. of the Federal Court,
Trial Division wrote: ‘The enactment by Parliament of Part IV of
the Canadian Human Rights Act, later replaced by the Privacy Act,
illustrated its recognition of the importance of the protection of
individual privacy. A purposive approach to the interpretation of
the Privacy Act is thus justified by the statute’s quasi-constitutional
legislative roots.’”34 Generally speaking, as Vanessa MacDonnell
writes, “quasi-constitutional legislation is fundamental in the sense
that it implements constitutional imperatives.”35 Human rights
codes implement constitutional imperatives of equality and
protection of civil liberties and so are “clear examples of
fundamental laws.”36 The historical origins of the Privacy Act
31

Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] S.C.J. No. 63, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403

(S.C.C.).
32

Dyment, supra, note 28, at 427.
Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] S.C.J. No. 65, [1982] 2 S.C.R.
145, at 157-58 (S.C.C.). The term “quasi-constitutional” is applied to human rights legislation by the
SCC in Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs, [1996] S.C.J. No. 55, [1996] 3 S.C.R.
566, at 577 (S.C.C.).
34
Lavigne, supra, note 29, at para. 24, citing Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Canada (Labour
Relations Board), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1076, [1996] 3 F.C. 609, at 652 (F.C.T.D.) [emphasis of Gonthier J.].
35
Vanessa MacDonnell, “A Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation” (2016) 53:2
Osgoode Hall L.J. 508, at 519.
36
Id.
33
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within the Canadian Human Rights Act therefore confers on the
Privacy Act the same status. In the case of public sector personal
data protection legislation, the constitutional imperative further lies
in the fundamental importance of privacy more broadly, as an
individual right central to democratic society enshrined in section 8
of the Charter.
Categorizing PIPEDA as “quasi-constitutional” despite its
application to commercial entities and not government is also on
par with previous treatment of human rights codes as quasiconstitutional, in that human rights codes of course also apply
beyond government actors into the private sector. The move again
begins in the Federal Court (which is the court with jurisdiction to
hear complaints related to PIPEDA as well as the federal Privacy
Act), in Eastmond in 2004, where Lemieux J. writes, “I have no
hesitation in classifying PIPEDA as a fundamental law of Canada
just as the Supreme Court of Canada ruled the federal Privacy Act
enjoyed quasi-constitutional status” and citing Lavigne,37 for the
purpose of holding that the Canada Labour Code does not deprive
workers in federally regulated industries of availing themselves of
the privacy protections and remedy-seeking provisions of
PIPEDA.38 The “quasi-constitutional status” of PIPEDA is
discussed again by the Federal Court in Nammo v. TransUnion of
Canada Inc. in 2010, where the Court finds the process of
assessing damages for violation of privacy rights under PIPEDA to
be analogous to SCC reasoning regarding damages for Charter
breaches by government actors, namely as a “meaningful response
to the seriousness of the breach and the objectives of
compensation, upholding Charter values and deterring future
37

Eastmond, supra, note 29, at para. 100.
Id., at para. 95:
The case before me does not engage the legislative will over an ordinary court action. What
we are faced with in this case are two statutory regimes: one provided for under PIPEDA
and the other mandated by the Canada Labour Code, a situation which the Ontario Court of
Appeal faced in Ford Motor Company of Canada v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission),
[2001] O.J. No. 4937, where the provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Act and the
Ontario Labour Code were at play. Notwithstanding the fact an arbitrator had ten years
earlier ruled the complainant’s discharge was justified, a Board of Inquiry established under
the Human Rights Act took jurisdiction and ordered his reinstatement.
38
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breaches” and thus concluding that “the same reasoning applies to
a breach of PIPEDA, which is quasi-constitutional legislation.”39
In 2013 the SCC indirectly accepted that PIPEDA is quasiconstitutional, by way of its categorization of Alberta’s Personal
Information Protection Act as quasi-constitutional, stating that
The ability of individuals to control their personal information is
intimately connected to their individual autonomy, dignity and privacy.
These are fundamental values that lie at the heart of a democracy. As
this Court has previously recognized, legislation which aims to protect
control over personal information should be characterized as ‘quasiconstitutional’ because of the fundamental role privacy plays in the
40
preservation of a free and democratic society.

It is a short step then from there to Douez, where Karakatsanis J.
essentially states that all privacy protective legislation is “quasiconstitutional”.41
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF ADJUDICATING QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS IN LOCAL COURTS
Given this status of privacy protections as of core importance to
democratic society, then, the problem with forum-selection clauses
in consumer contracts is two-fold: these clauses both potentially
deprive individuals of fundamental rights; and deprive local courts
of their central role as guardians and adjudicators of such rights.
Canadian adjudicators have considered this combination of
individual and collective value in domestically rooted privacy
protection in two previous variants. First, the Federal Court
established in 2007 that PIPEDA applies to foreign Internet-based
companies that collect, use and/or disclose personal information of
Canadians along the lines of the usual “real and substantial
connection” test to determine a court’s jurisdiction — in other
words, data collection from Canadians occurs “in Canada”
39

[2010] F.C.J. No. 1510, 2010 FC 1284, at para. 74 (F.C.).
Local 401, supra, note 29, at para. 19 (emphasis added). Alberta PIPA is “substantially
similar” provincial private sector privacy legislation, as set out via an order of the Governor in
Council under PIPEDA, supra, note 23, s. 26(2).
41
Douez, supra, note 1, at para. 59.
40
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regardless of where the company is located.42 Second, the Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has invalidated choice of law
provisions in consumer contracts, thereby considering PIPEDA to
apply regardless of such provisions in terms of service and privacy
policies.43 Given this trajectory, the issue of forum selection
clauses is coloured by the question of whether a foreign court
could or would apply Canadian federal or provincial privacy
legislation, and so respect the principle that consumers cannot be
compelled to contract out of these privacy protections.
Justice Karakatsanis’s discussion of the public policy reasons
for refusing to enforce the Facebook forum selection clause builds
on the “quasi-constitutional” characterization of British Columbia’s
Privacy Act by considering local courts as uniquely qualified to
hear disputes arising from legislation that protects a fundamental
right. As she writes, “... And since Ms. Douez’s matter requires an
interpretation of a statutory privacy tort, only a local court’s
interpretation of privacy rights under the Privacy Act will provide
clarity and certainty about the scope of the rights to others in the
province.”44
Further, while Karakatsanis J. acknowledges the importance of
forum selection clauses generally, as noted above, she also sees them
as by their nature disrupting the general “public good” of local
adjudication of claims, in that “forum selection clauses divert public
adjudication of matters out of the provinces, and court adjudication in
each province is a public good. Courts are not merely ‘law-making
and applying venues’; they are institutions of ‘public norm generation
and legitimation, which guide the formation and understanding of
relationships in pluralistic and democratic societies’”.45
42

Lawson v. Accusearch Inc. (c.o.b. Abika.com), [2007] F.C.J. No. 164, 2007 FC 125 (F.C.).
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “After a significant Adobe data breach, customer
questions company’s security safeguards and the response it provided about impacts on his personal
information”, PIPEDA Report of Findings #2014-015 (September 3, 2014), <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opcactions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2014/pipeda-2014-015/>.
44
Douez, supra, note 1, at para. 59. While Karakatsanis J. does not mention it, it is worth
noting that the causes of action created under the BC Privacy Act have become more common in the
last 10 years, though there are still only a handful of cases decided by the British Columbia courts
each year. In other words, the interpretation of this legislation is still evolving.
45
Id., at para. 25, citing Trevor C.W. Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), at 41 [hereinafter “Farrow”].
43
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Collective interests are thus at stake in this problem of when to
enforce forum selection clauses in consumer contracts, and the
fundamental nature of the rights at issue results in local courts
being not only entitled but responsible for protecting “‘the social,
economic, or political policies of the enacting state in the
collective interest’.”46 As Karakatsanis J. goes on to state,
... Canadian courts have a greater interest in adjudicating cases impinging
on constitutional and quasi-constitutional rights because these rights play
an essential role in a free and democratic society and embody key
Canadian values. There is an inherent public good in Canadian courts
deciding these types of claims. Through adjudication, courts establish
47
norms and interpret the rights enjoyed by all Canadians.

Justice Abella too considered the adjudication of “a fundamental
right like privacy” to fall within “the public policy concerns relating
to access to domestic courts”.48 The dissent strongly disagrees,
instead favouring the public policy reasons for enforcing forum
selection clauses. The dissent’s reasons mainly stress the established
value of predictability for businesses, but also as indirectly
benefitting Canadian consumers in that by “reducing litigation risk
[businesses] can generate savings that can be passed on to
consumers” and that “the certainty which comes with enforcement
of forum selection clauses allows foreign companies to offer online
access to Canadians.”49 The dissent does not address whether the
underlying privacy rights at stake should be afforded any special
status, and so does not consider whether some more fundamental
rights are best adjudicated in a consumer’s home courts.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CITIZEN-CONSUMER IN THE DIGITAL
INFORMATION ECONOMY
The rapid growth of privately-owned digital networks provides the
“borderless” technological context for what are often trans-border
46
Douez, id., at para. 52, citing Catherine Walsh, “The Uses and Abuses of Party
Autonomy in International Contracts” (2010) 60 U.N.B.L.J. 12, at 15.
47
Douez, id., at para. 58.
48
Id., at para. 104.
49
Id., at paras. 160-161.
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contracts between foreign-based businesses and Canadian
consumers.50 At the same time, our social world has been
increasingly dominated by services provided by a few mainly U.S.based companies, such that participating in platforms like Facebook
becomes a nearly essential means of engaging with friends and
family both locally and from afar.51 Consequently, much of our lives,
at least in the developed world, has come to be ruled by terms of
service with private companies located in the United States: courts
have started to recognize that the privatization of our social spaces,
means of gathering and communicating, and means of resolving
disputes cannot be allowed to compromise fundamental Canadian
rights and values.52
In the course of the enactment of federal private-sector privacy
legislation in 2000, Tina Piper complained that PIPEDA failed to
live up to its potential to secure substantive human rights-based
privacy, and instead was more business-oriented, designed to
encourage e-commerce by reassuring consumers that their personal
data would be subject to the rules set out in the Act.53 With Douez,
I am arguing, the substantive human rights-based approach to
private sector privacy protection is gaining ground. As with
PIPEDA, developing data processing and storage technologies are
50

Andrea Slane, “Tales, Techs and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization and
the Legal Construction of Borderlessness on the Internet” (2008) 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 129.
51
Douez, supra, note 1, at para. 56.
52
Justice Karakatsanis cites Trevor Farrow for support for the principle that adjudication of
disputes in local courts is a public good, but Farrow’s book goes further, warning that private means
of settling disputes, have begun to compromise democratic values more broadly: “Citizens claim,
protect, deliberate about, and create rights and law that, in turn, regulate their life choices and
activities. Limiting, curtailing, or impoverishing this democratic mechanism through processes of
privatization … will therefore clearly have repercussion for the ways in which we regulate our
individual and collective wellbeing.” Farrow, supra, note 45, at 42.
53
Tina Piper, “The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act: A Lost
Opportunity to Democratize Canada’s ‘Technological Society’” (Fall 2000) 23 Dal. L.J. 253. As
Piper writes,
The protection of personal information as a market commodity results from the
consumerization of citizenship, reliance on the market to mediate disputes and the focus on
method and self-interest. Short-term results ensue, minimizing or negating the human right
to privacy. The commodification of information objectifies human interactions, fragments
communities and molds social relations to the market model by relegating information,
whose free exchange is vital to the creation and maintenance of communities and
relationships, to the status of a market good.
Id., at 9 of 37.
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the catalyst for legal change, in that these technologies facilitate
business models that greatly enhance the risks to privacy, and
courts regularly see the development of privacy-compromising
technologies as calling for stronger legal interventions to protect
consumers and citizens alike.54 As Sharpe J.A. writes for the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones:
It is within the capacity of the common law to evolve to respond to the
problem posed by the routine collection and aggregation of highly
personal information that is readily accessible in electronic form.
Technological change poses a novel threat to a right of privacy that has
been protected for hundreds of years by the common law under various
guises and that, since 1982 and the Charter, has been recognized as a
55
right that is integral to our social and political order.

In some ways, what Piper calls the “consumerization of
citizenship” has continued to intensify, risking depletion of rights
that citizens have come to enjoy in democratic societies. The
Douez decision is evidence of push back against such a trend, by
extending citizen-like protections to consumers in the online
context where divisions between public and private sectors are
undeniably not as meaningful as they once were. Responding to
the development of the Internet, mobile digital communications
applications, and an ever-growing array of devices that collect and
process personal information from users, Canadian courts are
increasingly treating private sector privacy protections as having a
54
In R. v. Spencer, [2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212 (S.C.C.), Cromwell J. writes
for the Court:
In Duarte, the Court distinguished between a person repeating a conversation with a suspect
to the police and the police procuring an audio recording of the same conversation. The
Court held that the danger is ‘not the risk that someone will repeat our words but the much
more insidious danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record
and transmit our words’: at pp. 43-44. Similarly in this case, the police request that the ISP
disclose the subscriber information was in effect a request to link Mr. Spencer with precise
online activity that had been the subject of monitoring by the police and thus engaged a
more significant privacy interest than a simple question posed by the police in the course of
an investigation.
Id., at para. 67, citing R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
55
Supra, note 25, at para. 68. The paragraphs in Jones citing the development of digital
information technologies as a primary justification for Ontario courts’ recognizing the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion are in turn quoted in Doe v. N.D. to justify establishing the tort of
“public disclosure of embarrassing private facts” in Ontario as well. Doe v. N.D., supra, note 25,
at paras. 39-41.
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similar status to public sector privacy protections, including the
Charter: Douez is the latest instalment furthering this trend. It is
evidence of the triumph of Cockfield’s “liberal approach” which he
concluded “produces superior policy outcomes when technological
changes undermine contemporary values and interests.”56
Gertrude Stein’s famous 1937 line “there is no there there”
describes changes to the physical environment of the city where
she grew up.57 The line was adapted by Michael Geist in the title of
his 2001 article “Is There a There There?” to discuss issues raised
by Internet technologies which threw into question established
rules for determining jurisdiction.58 With the majority reasons in
Douez, the quote can again be adapted to “there is a there there” —
namely, the decision names Canadian courts as holding the public
policy imperative to adjudicate Canadian consumers’ privacy
rights in the always evolving digital era. The decision plants a
stake in the ground, considering the rights of Canadians online to
be a matter of sovereign authority, in a political and economic
context where the heft of our much larger southern neighbour
would otherwise routinely move protection of a fundamental right
like privacy outside of Canada.

56
57
58

Cockfield, supra, note 21.
Gertrude Stein, Everybody’s Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1937), at 289.
Geist, supra, note 1.

